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The	Copenhagen	negotiations	did	not	result	in	the	global	environmental	 treaty	 desired	 by	many,	 but,	 instead,	 in	plans	 to	 reduce	greenhouse	gas	 (“GHG”)	 emissions	or	
carbon	intensity	from	fifty-five	nations,	including	China,	India,	
and	 the	United	 States.1	 The	U.S.	 pledge,	 to	 reduce	 emissions	
by	seventeen	percent,	came	with	a	catch:	Congressional	action.2	
Enacting	federal	climate	change	legislation	in	the	United	States	
has	been	difficult	because	policymakers	fear	that	increased	regu-
lation	may	place	domestic	industry	at	a	competitive	disadvantage,	
and	that	production	facilities	will	relocate,	thereby	causing	carbon	
leakage—the	movement	of	emissions	to	a	less	regulated	coun-
try—and	associated	U.S.	job	losses.3	Manifesting	these	fears,	the	
Senate	resolved,	in	1997,	that	the	United	States	should	not	consent	
to	an	international	agreement	that	does	not	limit	emissions	from	
developing	countries.4
Monumentally,	in	June	2009,	the	U.S.	House	of	Representa-
tives	passed	H.R.	2454,	the	American	Clean	Energy	and	Security	
Act	(“ACES”):5	legislation	designed,	in	part,	to	reduce	GHG	emis-
sions	by	placing	a	cap	on	emissions	and	issuing	a	certain	number	
of	permits,	or	allowances,	for	the	release	of	the	emissions.6	One	
measure,	intended	to	alleviate	carbon	leakage,	grants	to	eligible	
domestic	sectors	allowance	rebates,	and	another,	the	International	
Reserve	Allowance	Program	(“IRAP”)	requires	importers	of	for-
eign	goods	to	submit	international	reserve	allowances	(“IRA”).7	
Although	Congress	is	unlikely	to	enact	ACES,	due	in	part	to	a	
similar	Senate	bill,	future	legislation	is	likely	to	contain	compa-
rable	language.8
Domestic	rebates	and	importer	allowance	requirements,	such	
as	those	in	ACES,	are	likely	to	violate	U.S.	obligations	under	the	
General	Agreement	on	Tariffs	and	Trade	(“GATT”).9	GATT	pro-
hibits	the	use	of	trade-restrictive	measures,	i.e.,	taxes,	laws	and	
regulations,	to	protect	domestic	industry,	but	it	allows	their	use	to	
achieve	legitimate	environmental	goals.10	In	particular,	Article	I	
prohibits	discrimination	by	member	nations	between	“like”	prod-
ucts	from	different	nations,	and	Article	III	prohibits	discrimination	
between	“like”	imported	and	U.S.	goods.11	These	rules	are	tem-
pered	by	the	Article	XX	General	Exceptions,	pursuant	to	which	
member	nations	may	employ	measures	violating	substantive	pro-
visions	for	the	achievement	of	limited	policy	goals,	including	the	
“conservation	of	exhaustible	natural	resources.”12
The	 importer	allowance	 requirement	 in	ACES	 is	 likely	 to	
violate	GATT	Articles	I	and	III	because	it	treats	“like”	products	
dissimilarly.	IRAP	requires	importers	to	submit	IRAs	based	upon	
a	“general	 [calculation]	methodology”	 to	ensure	 that	 imported	
and	U.S.	goods	are	subject	 to	similar	GHG	emissions	require-
ments.13	The	calculation	is	likely	to	violate	Article	I	if	it	treats	
“like”	foreign	goods	from	two	countries	dissimilarly	based	upon	
non-product	specific	factors	such	as	sector	or	economy-wide	GHG	
emissions.14	Five	exceptions	to	IRAP	largely	exclude	imported	
goods	from	the	program	based	upon	factors	that	indirectly	indi-
cate	if	the	imported	goods	are	regulated	similarly	to	“like”	U.S.	
goods,	e.g.,	whether	 the	 imported	goods	originate	 in	countries	
with	a	binding	emissions	agreement,	rather	than	whether	fewer	
emissions	were	actually	released	during	the	manufacture	of	the	
product.15	These	exceptions	are	also	likely	to	treat	“like”	domestic	
and	imported	products	differently,	violating	Article	III.
ACES	is	also	likely	to	violate	Article	III	by	failing	to	provide	
equality	of	competitive	conditions	for	“like”	U.S.	and	imported	
goods	by	providing	domestic	actors	avenues	to	lower	compliance	
costs	unavailable	to	foreign	producers.	Domestic	actors	may	dem-
onstrate	compliance	by	holding	international	and	domestic	allow-
ances,	offset	credits,	and	compensatory	allowances;	banking	and	
borrowing	allowances;	submitting	allowances	received	for	“free;”	
or	 paying	 a	penalty	 for	 non-compliance,	while	 importers	may	
only	submit	and	bank	IRAs.16	As	a	result,	only	domestic	actors	
may	determine	whether	it	is	cost-effective	to	violate	ACES	and	
pay	a	penalty	or	invest	in	forestry	projects	to	earn	offsets	rather	
than	buy	allowances,	while	importers	do	not	have	such	options.17
Nonetheless,	GATT	Article	XX	permits	certain	trade-restric-
tive	environmental	measures	and	arguably	should	permit	the	use	
of	measures	that	“accurately	assess	carbon	leakage	and	competi-
tiveness	losses”	and	impose	a	“fair”	price	upon	imported	prod-
ucts.18	To	ensure	that	U.S.	legislation	is	covered	by	the	Article	
XX	exception,	 IRAP	and	 its	 implementing	 regulations	 should	
require	importers	to	submit	allowances	based	upon	a	methodol-
ogy	that	accurately	accounts	for	emissions.	To	avoid	disparate	
treatment	between	“like”	products	of	two	countries	or	between	
“like”	 imported	and	domestic	products,	 IRAP	should	calculate	
allowance	requirements	based	upon	product-specific	GHG	emis-
sions	rather	than	economy-wide	or	sector-specific	emissions.	In	
addition,	importers	should	be	permitted	to	submit	offset	credits,	as	
well	as	other	allowances,	and	borrow	allowances	to	equalize	com-
petitive	conditions	between	“like”	domestic	and	imported	prod-
ucts.	Moreover,	to	further	the	goals	of	ACES,	exceptions	should	
only	be	granted	when	an	imported	product	is	manufactured	with	
fewer	emissions	than	a	“like”	U.S.	product,	thereby	challenging	
domestic	actors	to	reduce	emissions.
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